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To shift our concentration from matters of internal organization to those of the
political setting moves us toward a long-needed reintegration between professional
analysis of regulatory administration and the liveliest currents of general empirical
political theory. Among the latter currents, one of the most promising consists of
Theodore J. Lowi's categorization of policies and related political processes into
distributive, regulatory, constituency, and redistributive types. According to Lowi,
each of these types carries with it a distinctive pattern of political activity. In the
legislative arena, for example, he finds that regulatory measures are much more
amended on the floor of both House and Senate than those of the other
types - and that this is irrespective of whether the President at the time is known
as "strong" or "weak." One of the many intriguing possible implications of Lowi's
study is that we could purposely design policy structures to produce desired
patterns of politics, or avoid undesired patterns: regulatory approaches to policy
will activate Congress; distributive approaches to policy dampen public involvement. Contra much conventional wisdom (which has tended to think in President
versus Congress terms), presidential ascendancy in policy development is not
universal in fact and is not a panacea in principle. Active regulatory development is
likely to be associated with both strong presidential leadership and significant
congressional contributions to the shaping of policy.
The politics of policy structures, which Lowi's conceptualization opens up for
us, leads us to a more fundamental lev-i of analysis, one that encourages us to relate
regulatory questions to the larger political arena in novel ways. And if we can break
down the isolation of regulatory studies from general political analysis, we will have
taken a significant step toward strengthening the contribution of academic political
science to important governmental problems.
Michael D. Reagan
University of California at Riverside

REGULATORY

STRUCTURE AND REGULATORY PERFORMANCE:

A CRITIQUE OF THE ASH COUNCIL REPORT
Roger C. Cramton, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States

On February 11, 1971, President Nixon released a report of his Advisory Council on ExecuThis article was originallypreparedfor deliveryat the
Spring 1971 meeting of the Section on Antitrust Law of
the AmericanBar Association.It is reproducedherewith
the permissionof the Section on AntitrustLaw.

tive Organization (the Ash Council) entitled "A
New Regulatory Framework - A Report on Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies."' The

report recommends far-reachingchanges in the
structure and regulatory responsibilities of six
independent regulatory agencies - the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Maritime Commission,
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Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and
the Securities and Exchange Commission - and a
reduction in the size of the Federal Communications Commission. The President's accompanying
statement urged vigorous public discussion of the
Ash Council's Report and early submission of
comments and criticism from interested public and
private groups.
The purpose of this article is to consider the
basic premise of the Ash Council Report - that the
structure of a regulatory agency has a profound
effect on regulatory performance. This premise
underlies three general proposals for reform which
the report advances for broad application in these
agencies:
1. The substitution of a single adminsitrator
for the multi-headed board or commission.
2. Dramatic changes in the agencies' internal
decisional process.
3. Judicial review by a new, nonconstitutional,
specialized court, rather than the regular courts of
appeal, or, in the case of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, a special three-judge district court.
Each of these proposals will be briefly examined.
Regulatory Structure: The Single Administrator
The Ash Council recommends that the independent regulatory commissions in the transportation,
power, securities, and consumer protection fields
bte transformed into executive agencies headed by
single administrators responsible to the President.
The substitution of a single administrator for the
multi-headed collegial body is the kingpin in the
Ash Council's whole approach; it is presented
almost as a universal panacea for the solution of
the problems of the independent regulatory agencies.
The report recounts the advantages of a single
administrator at great length. These advantages are
framed in terms of relatively abstract concepts
such as "accountability," "responsiveness," "efficiency," "good management," "expedition," and
the like. We are told that these virtues, and other
good things such as improved personnel, will flow
from the substitution of a single administrator for
the multi-headed collegial body. All of this is
somewhat reminiscent of Lewis Carroll's remark
that "It must be so because you have repeated it
three times!"
In the view of the Ash Council, the single
administrator is godlike, and the multi-headed
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collegial body suffers from a multitude of sins.
The proposition is not supported by empirical
evidence, but is asserted as a self-evident, universally applicable truth. I am skeptical of an assertion that seems over broad and that must be taken
on faith.
The case that is made for the single administrator has a certain surface plausibility. There are
areas, such as the current development of environmental standards by the Environmental Protection
Agency, in which a single administrator reporting
directly to the President seems likely to do a more
effective job than a multi-headed board. On the
other hand, we know that single-minded, strong
men running very important government operations are susceptible of great drawbacks. One
could refer, in terms of responsiveness as against
rigidity, to such agencies as the Selective Service
System under Lewis B. Hershey or the FBI under
J. Edgar Hoover.
I am not referring at this point to the quality of
regulatory performance, but only to the question
of accountability and responsiveness, to which the
Ash Council gives great emphasis. Perhaps a more
crucial question is how the structure of an agency
affects the performance of its regulatory tasks. I
am doubtful whether there is any simple relationship, for reasons elaborated below.
Criteria for Regulatory Performance
In order to determine the relationship between
structure and performance, one must first have a
consistent notion of what constitutes good
regulatory performance. What are the criteria for
judging regulatory performance? The Ash Council
Report gives us very little help on this question. It
tends to suggest two criteria: (1) expedition in
formulating policy and completing proceedings;
and (2) responsiveness of the agency, particularly
to signals from the Executive. While important, it
is hard to accept these criteria as the sole or most
important ones.
Expedition, of course, is fine if agencies are
doing what you want them to do. Some critics
believe that the combination of all of the transportation agencies in a single agency - surely desirable on efficiency grounds-would
lead to a
dominance of current Interstate Commerce Commission regulatory attitudes and would provide the
opportunity, now lacking because of intermodal
competition which the separate agencies are unable to control, to create an effective cartel in the
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transportation industries. Under this view, substitution of a single administrator for transportation
would be disastrous unless accompanied by legislative revision of transportation policy, including
substantial deregulation.
Criteria for evaluating regulatory performance,
it is evident, are needed in order to assess proposed
changes in regulation. Until the goals against which
regulation is to be measured are determined, it is
impossible to determine whether or not those
goals will be achieved by a structural change from
a multi-headed body to a single administrator.2
The historical contest between Congress and
the President for control or isolation of some of
these regulatory functions needs also to be mentioned at this point. Congress has sought over the
years to insulate certain regulatory functions from
Executive control, perhaps enhancing at the same
time the control of congressional committees over
those same functions and activities. Organizational
theory has no good answer for this struggle
between the Executive and Congress; it is a
question of politics and government which the
electorate should decide.3
Lack of Empirical Evidence
A second comment is that casual experience
does not support an unqualified preference for the
single administrator. One can look around the
federal government today and find good and bad
examples of each type of organization, depending
upon what your own criteria for evaluation are.In
other words, there is a lack of a factual basis for
the Ash Council's conclusion that single-headed
agencies perform better. It is something you have
to arrive at by a leap of faith, by an intuitive jump.
The Ash Council Report is a failure as an empirical
document.
And yet many of these questions are susceptible to examination. It is my impression, for
example, that the Veterans Administration
-which is an agency headed by a single administrator -has not obtained markedly better personnel than the Securities and Exchange Commission, a multi-headed collegial body. Nor is it
evident to me that the Comptroller of the Currency - again a single administrator - has done a
more effective job of banking regulation than the
Federal Reserve Board or the Home Loan Bank
Board, both of which are multi-headed agencies.
Further instances are easily found. Is there any
evidence, for example, that the regulatory functions of the Departments of Agriculture and
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Interior are performed better than those of the
independent commissions? Our preoccupation
with the regulatory functions of the independent
agencies has blinded us to the fact that there may
be lots of bodies buried in obscure regulatory
corners in the executive departments. There are
other factors which are just as important or more
important than regulatory structure.4
Other Plausible Explanations of Regulatory Defects
Two other plausible explanations of why regulation has defects must be explored before structure can be given the decisive role assigned to it by
the Ash Council. One alternative theory is that
many of the problems of regulation are inherent in
the regulatory task itself, and especially when the
regulatory task is one of giving out benefits to an
industry which has constant contact with the
dispensing agency. If a small group of regulated
firms have great interest in regulatory activities,
while the general public is only peripherally or
marginally affected, it is inevitable that the information, concern, and political clout of the regulated firms will be effectively communicated to
the agencies through our political process. Our
regulatory agencies, regardless of organization,
tend to be highly responsive to the political
pressures that are brought to bear upon them. The
general public, which brings its latent power to
bear only in situations of failure or catastrophe
that arouse general concern, has much less interest
in influencing regulatory decisions. Regulators
- well aware of the episodic character of public
interest in regulation - lean over backwards to
avoid failures of service, dramatic accidents, and
the like. The pressures of incumbent firms, intent
upon protecting their franchised positions against
new competitors or new technology, are often in
the same direction; they tend to be as cautious in
approach and as fearful of calamity as the regulators. It is this community of interest between
regulators and regulated that is often referred to
under the rubric of "captive agencies."5
A second alternative theory is that the observed
defects of regulation are largely the results of
inadequate, outmoded, or vague substantive policies. Railroad regulation was initially designed to
restrain the economic power of railroads in an era
when there were few, if any, competing forms of
transportation.6 Motor carrier regulation stems
from a period when competition was viewed as
undesirable, even for an industry with little or no
economies of scale.7 Aviation regulation, also
JULY/AUGUST 1972
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reflecting the New Deal era's distrust of market
forces, seeks to promote air service without regard
to its effects on other modes.8 Separate agencies
administer regulatory policies for different modes;
and subsidies to some modes in the construction
and maintenance of facilities (especially to water
and air carriers) are administered by other agencies
without regard to the effects on unsubsidized
transportation service. In short, there is no national transportation policy but only a melange of
confused and contradictory protective, promotional, and regulatory policies.
While transportation has served here as a
convenient example, other regulatory fields are
also characterized by divided authority, outmoded
policies, and vague standards.9 The confusion of
agencies and policies in the energy field, for
example, is widely recognized. It is no accident
that those agencies with the simplest and most
widely accepted missions - such as the protection
of the integrity of the securities markets by the
Securities and Exchange Commission - are commonly viewed as turning in the best performance.
The key to regulatory performance, under this
theory, is to be found not in agency structure but
in the opportunities or pitfalls inherent in the
substantive task of regulation.
It is my personal view that the two alternative
hypotheses outlined above are, in combination,
more plausible explanations of regulatory defects
than the Ash Council's undue emphasis on structure. While structure is important, other considerations are vastly more important.
Agency Decisional Process
In addition to the substitution of single administrators for most of the present boards and
commissions, the Ash Council Report proposes a
dramatic short circuiting of the decisional stages
now followed by most agencies. The initial decisions of hearing examiners in adjudicatory cases
would become final agency decisions unless the
single administrator, within a fixed period of 30
days, reversed or modified the initial decision
because it was inconsistent with agency policy.
Only a limited opportunity for postponing a final
decision by remanding a case for further hearing
would be provided; and it would be subject to a
further time limit of 30-45 days.
The ultimate objective, of course, is that of
expediting the decision of adjudicatory cases. In
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addition, limiting the administrator'sability to
evolve policy by means of case-by-caseadjudication would presumably force administratorsto
formulate regulatory policies in general rulemaking proceedings. Delegating greaterdecisional
authority to hearing examiners would have the
further effect of increasing their status, responsibility, and - hopefully - performance.Administrators, freed from a heavy workload of routine
controversies,could direct their attention to major
policy issues.

While these objectives are laudable ones, it
seems likely that the Ash Councilproposalis more
procrustean than workable. The choice between
rule making and adjudication as a method of
formulating policy is more complicated than the
Ash Council indicated.0 And a number of agencies already have gone very far in delegating
decisional authority in routine cases to hearing
examinersor to employee boards. 1 Furthersteps
along this line might achievemost of the objectives
sought by this aspect of the Ash Council Report.
A majorfactor, not fully consideredby the Ash
Council, is the effect of its shortened decisional
process on rights of party participation.The fixed
period of review by the administrator- a review
presumablylimited to questions of general policy
- would deprive the parties of any participation
duringthe final decisional stage. Once the hearing
examiner came down with his initial decision,
there would be no exceptions, no briefs, no oral
arguments. The administrator himself will have
only 30 days to master - by some mysterious
process, and without any further assistancefrom
the parties - the complexities of the case and to
reverse,modify, or affirmthe decision.
The consequences of this procedure would be
unfortunate. Briefs, exceptions, and oral arguments before an agency crystallize issues, illuminate the case, and help the agency reach a wiser
and more informed decision. They also provide
interestedpersonswith an effective opportunityto
educate the ultimate deciders.
Moreover, in many administrative cases, the
issues develop and changeas the case goes along. It
is not unusual for the decision at the agencylevel
to focus on matters that were not emphasizedby
the hearing examiner. In these situations, an
opportunity to submit briefs and argumentswhen
the case is before the agency for final decision may
be an essentialingredientof fairness. 2
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The Ash Council Report proposes the creation
of a specialized reviewing court, composed of
judges without life tenure, to review the decisions
of the transportation, power, and securities agencies. Once again, the proposal pursues laudable
goals - here the desire to relieve the federal courts
of an unnecessary burden and to improve the
review function.
An initial problem with the proposal is that it
would not make a dent in the heavy caseload of
the federal courts of appeals. The new specialized
reviewing court would have jurisdiction of cases
which constitute less than four per cent of the
present workload of the courts of appeals - a
miniscule decrease.l3 Other categories of cases,
especially labor and social security cases, would
need to be added in order to provide a specialized
administrative court of review with a caseload that
would relieve the courts of appeals of a substantial
burden.
Moreover, administrative review cases involving
regulatory action are fairly interesting. They enliven what is otherwise becoming a rather drab
appetite of criminal appeals - which constitute
about one-half of the cases that the United States
courts of appeals now hear. Federal appellate
courts will become specialized courts of criminal
appeals if other cases are withdrawn from their
jurisdiction.
. Further, any reconsideration of federal appellate jurisdiction raises questions of priorities. Why
should administrative appeals from such agencies
be the cases that are pruned away? These cases
involve substantial issues of federal law to which
the courts of appeals have contributed a great deal
of understanding. There are other classes of cases,
such as diversity litigation or the tremendous
burden of habeas corpus petitions involving repetitive examination of criminal issues that already
have been tried in state court proceedings, that are
much more deserving candidates for exclusion
from the federal courts.
Wholly apart from these workload considerations, the creation of specialized courts raises
complicated problems concerning their role, personnel, and the like. The strongest argument for a
specialized court can be made in areas like labor,
tax, and trade - areas which cut across the whole
economy rather than concentrate on a particular
industry. Several years ago the American Bar
Association proposed the creation of "administra-
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tive courts" to exercise final administrative authority in these areas.14 The Ash Council departs from
these earlier proposals both as to subject matter
(labor, tax, and trade are areas in which the Ash
Report does not apply its "administrative court"
proposal) and as to the nature of the court
(appellate rather than trial court as in the earlier
ABA proposals).
There are dangers in the application of a
specialized administrative court - whether trial or
appellate in nature - to one or a few regulated
industries.15 Where the agency is in the business
of handing out extremely valuable perquisites,
grants, licenses, and the like, which have enormous
effects on the economic fortunes of firms in the
industry, the dangers of partiality and departures
from adjudicatory fairness are enlarged. One can
be sure that industry representatives are going to
be constantly battling for appointment of specialists who know about and sympathize with their
problems. The administrative court approach is
most properly applicable in areas where adjudicative enforcement functions have a moral quality,
and where decisions turn on determinations of
past facts, which are required to be made on the
basis of a record. In situations of this kind, it may
make sense to use a specialized tribunal of high
quality - particularly at the trial stage.
An independent adjudicatory tribunal, cutting
across industry lines, also surmounts the separation-of-functions problem, which has been emphasized with respect to the Federal Trade Commission by former FTC Commissioner Elman.16
There is a legitimate difference of opinion concerning the significance of the separation-offunctions problem in administrative agencies.
Whatever one may think of the combination of
adjudicatory and prosecutory functions as a general problem, the objection has the strongest force
in those agencies, such as the National Labor
Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission, where adjudications typically involve nonrecurring past events and charges of antisocial
conduct. Economic regulation that looks to the
future, that is largely policy oriented, in which a
wide range of alternatives are considered by
regulatory bodies, has a very different character;
and in such proceedings the separation-offunctions problem is considerably reduced. The
Administrative Procedure Act recognizes this distinction by exempting rate making and initial
licensing from its separation-of-functions requirements. This distinction between types of pro-
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ceedings was implicitly recognized in placing the
prosecutory function in the unfair labor practice
field in an office independent from the National
Labor Relations Board. Current demands for a
similar separation with respect to the Federal
Trade Commission have not yet been acceded to.
The Ash Council proposal does not improve the
separation-of-functions problem in the trade field.
In fact, it worsens existing difficulties, because,
instead of a group of five people who can exercise
a moderating influence upon one another and who
may not be intimately involved in the earlier stages
of the case, the Ash Council would substitute a
single administrator in the trade practices area.
Since the administrator would be responsible for
the staff, responsible for the prosecutorial decisions, and then also responsible for the final
decision, affected persons are likely to be even
more fearful than now that the adjudication of
their cases will be by a prosecutor with a closed
mind. 17
Conclusion
While I am critical of the Ash Council proposals, my criticism should not be taken as a
defense of the status quo. Many things need to be
done to improve the structure, organization, and
procedures of our federal agencies. In some areas,
such as transportation, radical surgery may be
required, including experimentation with a single
administrator. 8
The Ash Council has performed a service in
pointing the finger at important problems and
suggesting the need for change. The particular
mechanisms which the Ash Council has recommended, however, should be not adopted. Inquiry
into needed changes in the regulatory process
should not be confined merely to structural or
organizational matters. There is an even greater
need for fundamental reexamination of the substantive premises and policies of regulation.
Notes
1. The President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, A New Regulatory Framework - Report on
Selected Independent Regulatory Agencies (1971),
hereinafter referred to as the Ash Council Report.
2. See Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: An Evaluation of the Ash Council Report (Washington, D.C.:
The Brooking Institution, Brookings Studies in the
Regulation of Economic Activity, 1971), p. 3.
3. See, e.g., G. Robinson, "On Reorganizing the Independent Regulatory Agencies, "Virginia Law Review, Vol.
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57 (1971), which ably summarizes the extensive
literature dealing with the organization and effectiveness of independent regulatory agencies. The Administrative Conference of the United States in its
"Views" on the Ash Council Report, concluded that:
"The status of the regulatory commissions raises
complex issues of political theory and practice that
cannot be evaluated solely in terms of managerial
efficiency. Those issues may be grouped for convenience under the headings of independence and
collegiality (or multimembership as distinct from a
single chief officer). Independence - a matter of
degree and in part a state of mind - has both positive
and negative aspects. Detachment from external
influences in making particularized decisions is generally considered to be desirable. Diffusion of responsibility that may produce hesitant or uncoordinated
governmental policies is generally regarded as undesirable. Whether or not an agency is independent in
these respects, however, is not exclusively determined
by whether the agency is located within or outside
the Executive Branch. Persuasive evidence has not yet
been adduced to show that the independent commissions, to a significantly greater degree than executive agencies, have achieved the desired detachment
or produced the weak or discordant policies.
"As for collegiality, consideration must be given
to values inherent in an official body that is not
dominated by a single will. Among those values are
diversity of background and experience, an open
decisional process, and a tendency toward modera-

tion in policy.

"Further study, including empirical examination
of the relative effectiveness of independent commissions and executive agencies performing comparable regulatory functions, is required before it
may be concluded that either form is generally the
more desirable."
Administrative Conference of the United States,
1970-71 Annual Report, p. 60, hereinafter cited as
Annual Report.
4. The Administrative Conference "Views" on the Ash
Council Report similarly concluded that:
"The deficiencies of regulation by collegial bodies
cannot be attributed solely or primarily to faulty
structure; the same deficiencies may be observed in
regulatory agencies headed by single administrators
responsible to the President. The view that substitution of a single administrator would solve regulatory problems is simplistic, unsupported by em-

pirical data, and overlooks other plausible expla-

nations of regulatory ills, especially the inherent

difficulties of regulating activities having a vast
impact on the economy and the absence in many
areas of legislative definition of regulatory goals.
Structural alteration in itself offers only possibilities
for limited improvement in regulatory performance;
it is no substitute for a thorough and critical
reexamination of the statutory framework in which
the agencies operate and of the policies they are
directed to carry out."

Annual Report, p. 61.
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5. See, e.g., R. Noll,
"The Economics and Politics of
Regulation," Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57 (1971):
"...The performance of regulated industries falls
short of a reasonable, attainable social objective
because the regulators operate under a different
definition of the public interest than that held by
society generally.
"... The process of regulation, regardless of how
or where it is performed, is inherently biased in favor
of regulated firms, even if regulators have the best of
intentions."

6.

7.

8.

9.

For recent attempts to develop a theory of regulation, see G. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic
Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 1 (1970), pp. 3-21; and Roger
Noll, supra, note 2.
See, e.g., J. Meyer, M. Peck, J. Stenason, and C.
Zwick, The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries, Harvard Economic Studies No.
109 (1959); J. Nelson, Railroad Transportation and
Public Policy (1959); R. Fellmuth, The Interstate
Commerce Omission (1970).
The legislative rationales for the regulation of
trucking are spelled out in W.K. Jones, Cases on
Regulated Industries, pp. 487-499 (1967). See also, J.
Meyer, supra, note 6, pp. 215-222, 263; and R.
Fellmuth, supra, note 6, pp. 119-135.
See, e.g., R. Caves, Air Transport and Its Regulators
(1962); W. Jones, supra, note 7, pp. 736-738; W.
Jordan, Airline Regulation in America (1970).
See, e.g., H. Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies (1962); and Noll, supra, note 5:
"The new regulation replaces the rule of law with
uncertainty and continual bargaining over the bounds
of legitimate behavior....
"A number of defects of regulation are related to
the vagueness of the regulatory mandate: unequal
treatment of like cases; additional uncertainty introduced by regulatory inconsistency; elaborate legal
procedures, since each case is, in essence, a new law;
and a much heavier caseload, since a prior adverse
decision does not sufficiently deter the raising of the
same issue."

10. See, e.g., G. Robinson, "The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform,"
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 118
(1970), p. 485.
11. See, e.g., J. Freedman, "Review Boards in the
Administrative Process," University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Vol. 117 (1969), p. 546; "Note,
Intermediate Appeal Boards for Administrative Agencies," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 81 (1968), p. 1325;
and C. Auerbach, "Scope of Authority of Federal
Administrative Agencies to Delegate Decision-Making
to Hearing Examiners," Minnesota Law Review, Vol.
48 (1964), p. 823.
12. The Administrative Conference "Views" on the Ash
Council Report concluded that:
"Limitation of party participation to the period
prior to an initial decision is undesirable as well as
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unfair. Wise decisions in complex regulatory cases are
largely dependent upon the illuminating and sharpening of issues which are most suitably provided by
the parties, including agency staff who have functioned as parties in the particular proceeding. Parties
who are denied participation in the final decisionmaking through public procedures may be tempted
to influence the agency through ex parte means.
"Other procedural devices, such as development of
policy through rulemaking rather than adjudication,
provision that decisions by hearing examiners are
final unless the agency determines that review is
desirable, reduction of interlocutory appeals, and use
of employee review boards to relieve agency heads of
routine cases, have expedited the decisional process,
enhanced the status of hearing examiner, prevented
repetitious consideration of routine matters, and
allowed agency heads to concentrate on important
questions of policy. The often imperative need to
improve agency functioning calls for sustained effort
to encourage procedural advances like those suggested above." (See Administrative Conference Recommendation No. 6 - Delegation of final decisional
authority subject to discretionary review by the
agency.)
Annual Report, pp. 62-63.
13. See N. Nathanson, "The Administrative Court Proposal of the President's Advisory Council on Executive Reorganization," Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57
(1971). The Administrative Conference "Views" on
the Ash Council Report stated that:
"The proposed new tribunal would not relieve the
regular courts of a substantial burden; less than three
percent of the cases making up the current workload
of the present reviewing courts would be affected. It
is highly doubtful whether such a small caseload
justifies the creation of a new tribunal. Moreover, if
the courts of appeals must be relieved of some of
their present workload, it would be a questionable
choice of priorities to relieve them of regulatory cases
rather than of other categories of cases, such as
diversity litigation, which do not involve significant
questions of federal law. Finally, a new tribunal with
review authority over the decisions of only a small
minority of agencies cannot be expected to make the
contributions to uniformity in administrative law
which the Ash Council sees as one of the advantages
of its establishment."
14. See U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, Legal Services and
Procedures, (1955), pp. 84-88;American Bar Association Report, Vol. 81 (1956), pp. 378-379 (Proceedings of the House of Delegates); and Minor, 'The
Administrative Court: Variations on a Theme," Ohio
State Law Journal, Vol. 19 (1958), p. 380.
15. The Administrative Conference "Views" on the Ash
Council Report stated that:
"There is a danger that a narrowly specialized
reviewing court, concerned with the actions of only a
few industries, might become or give the
appearance
of becoming identified with the
agency or industry
point of view. Appointments to such a court could
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pose a special problem, because, while of vital
importanceto the regulatedindustry,they would be
less subject to broad professionaland publicscrutiny
than appointmentsto the courtsof appeals."
16. See P. Elman, "The RegulatoryProcess:A Personal
View," BNA Antitrust and Trade Reg. Report No.
475, D1-D5 (1970); P. Elman, "AdministrativeReform of the Federal Trade Commission,"Georgia
Law Journal, Vol. 59 (1971), p. 777.

17. The AdministrativeConference"Views"on the Ash
CouncilReportsimilarlystated that:
"One traditional ground of attack on the independent regulatorycommission,particularlyapplied to
enforcement functions of such agencies as the Federal TradeCommission,is the chargethat unfairness
to respondentsmay result when agency heads exercise prosecutory and rulemakingfunctions along
with that of adjudication.Whateverthe meritsof this
charge as a general matter, the concentration of
regulatory authority in a single administratorincreases at least the appearance,though not necessarily the reality, of a mergerof inconsistent functions.
AnnualReport,p. 62.
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18. Thus the AdministrativeConference"Views"stated
that:
"Whilethe Conferenceis not persuadedthat the
proposed form of agency organization- a single
administrator responsible to the President - is
generallysuperiorto the collegialform, it may offer
advantagesin specific areasof regulation,particularly
where vigorous departuresfrom existing regulatory
techniques are called for. Whetheran existing regulatory frameworkshould or should not be continued
is largely dependent upon substantive rather than
organizational considerations. If a decision were
made, for example, to eliminate various restraints
that now affect the variousmodes of transportation,
the remainingregulatorycontrols might practicably
be vested in a new agencystructureddifferentlyfrom
those now in existence. With respect to the other
regulatory agencies, a major realignmentof regulatory responsibilitiesis not proposed and a convincing case has not as yet been made for replacement of the collegial form with a single administrator."
AnnualReport,p. 61.

THE REGULATORY AGENCIES

John E, Moore, University of California, Santa Barbara

There is a curious tendency, most recently
exemplified in the Ash Council Report,1 to
distinguish the shortcomings of the regulatory
process from those of the political system of
which it is a part, ascribe those shortcomings to
the structural or procedural characteristics associated with the regulatory process, and then fail to
distinguish the variety of functions performed by
different regulatory agencies and the varied environments in which those functions are performed.
This article proceeds from a rather different set
of premises:

should not be continued is largely dependent
upon substantive rather than organizational
considerations"2
* these substantive considerations vary with the
nature of the policy area, regulatory function,
and political environment
* while changes in structure and procedure may
improve the capacity of the "regulatory process" as a whole to cope with the varied
problems it confronts, such changes should be
near the bottom rather than at the top of our
agenda.

* much

The least we can do to mark the end of an era is
to fashion a new metaphor. "Recycling" implies a
deliberate provision for invigorating and redefining
the goals of the regulatory agencies, as contrasted
with (1) the pessimistic metaphysical pathos of the
"life cycle" metaphor that despairs of change in
the absence of a jarring crisis in the regulated
activity, or overwhelming evidence of senility in
the regulatory agency, and (2) the excessive
optimism of those who would have the regulatory
agencies operating at an unremittingly feverish
pitch.

of the malaise associated with the
regulatory process can be attributed to the same
forces that are responsible for increasing disaffection from the political system generally
* responses based almost exclusively upon
structural or procedural reforms are more likely
to compound than to reduce this disaffection,
since they continue to confuse substance with
process
* as the Administrative Conference observed in its
"Views" on the Ash Council Report, "whether
an existing regulatory framework should or
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